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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

II. CONTRACTS

Little occurred in the general field of contract law during the
year to merit attention, but a few cases are worthy of some notice.
In one of them, that of Ozier v. Harris,' the facts growing out of
a sales transaction came close to estopping the defendant from
relying on the statute of frauds 2 as a defense to a suit for an
alleged breach of contract. A motion to dismiss the action, based
on the statute of frauds, was sustained, however, not only in the
trial court but also in the Appellate Court on appeal and before
the Illinois Supreme Court on certificate of importance. The
opinion of the latter tribunal presents a clear cut and precise
analysis of the six elements necessary to invoke the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, for which reason it merits perusal.
The effect to be given to a release of one joint tort feasor,
made prior to suit or judgment, is generally not a matter of doubt
although there may be room for inquiry as to whether the parties
concerned are really joint feasorsA The Appellate Court for
the Fourth District, in McClure v. Lence,4 has now come to the
conclusion that a release given to one for a cause of action resting
on the wrongful death statute 5 will serve to bar a subsequent suit
against another for the same injury and death based on the Illinois
Liquor Control Act. As the right of recovery was there said to
rest on the fact of injury and not merely on the sale of liquor,
the Appellate Court elected to follow the rule of the Chapin case, 7
although there is at least one decision to the contrary."
In contrast, the effect to be given to a release granted after
judgment had been obtained against one of a number of joint tort
1411 Ill. 160, 103 N. E. (2d) 485 (1952), affirming 343 Ill. App. 400, 99 N. E. (2d)
395 (1951).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 1212, § 4.
3 On this point, see note In 26 CHICAO-KENT LAW REVIEw 358 discussing the
case of Manthei v. Heimerdinger, 332 Ill. App. 335, 75 N. E. (2d) 132 (1947).
4345 Ill. App. 158, 102 N. E. (2d) 546 (1951), noted in 30 CHTCAGO-KFNT LAW
REvi1w 273.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 1 et seq.
6 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 94 et seq.
7 Chapin v. Eastern Illinois R. R. Co., 18 Ill. App. 47 (1885).
8 Scharfenstein v. Forest City Knitting Co., 253 Il1. App. 190 (1929).
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feasors would seem to present a different story. That problem
faced the Appellate Court for the First District in the case of
Zboinsky v. Wjocik, 9 wherein the plaintiff began an action against
several defendants under a complaint containing three counts.
The first two counts were predicated upon the Dram Shop Act
but a third count, against two of the defendants, rested on a common law action for a malicious battery. The counts were severed
by agreement and two of the defendants stood trial under count
three. At that trial, a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff against one of these defendants but the other was found not
guilty. Execution was issued against the judgment debtor and,
as the count rested on a charge of malice, he was taken into custody
for failure to satisfy the execution.' 0 Subsequent thereto, the
plaintiff gave a release of general character to the other parties
concerned in the transaction. The incarcerated defendant thereupon asked to be released from custody and to have the judgment
against him satisfied of record on the theory that the release in
question inured to his benefit. The Appellate Court, however, held
that inasmuch as one of the released co-defendants had been found
not guilty he could not be said to have been a joint tort feasor
and, in addition, the character of the liability of the incarcerated
defendant had been changed by the judgment against him. The
release was, therefore, ineffective to procure his discharge or the
satisfaction of the judgment which had been pronounced against
him.
INSURANCE

In specialized areas of contract law, such as insurance, certain other cases merit attention. Mention was made last year of
the Appellate Court holding in the case of Canadian Radium &
Uranium Corporationv. Indemnity Insurance Company of North
America," a suit in which the plaintiff sought to recover money
expended in settling a suit against it, brought by an employee
9 347 Il. App. 226, 106 N. E. (2d) 764 (1952).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 5, authorizes a body execution in such a
situation.
11342 Ill. App. 456, 97 N. E.

Rzvicw 19-20.

(2d)

132 (1951),

noted in 30 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW
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of a licensee of its process, for injuries caused through the continued handling of plaintiff's product, which was radio-active in
nature. A certificate of importance having been granted, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed 12 on the ground that the meaning
of the word "accident," as used in the insurance policy, was not
to be determined by reference to the meaning given in cases
arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act,1 3 as had been
done in the court below, but had to be established "apart from
rules of strict construction applied to statutes in derogation of
the common law."'1 4 Pointing out that the peculiar meaning
assigned to the word "accident" in suits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act resulted from the notice requirements set out
therein, 15 the court said the word "accident" had to be given its
plain, ordinary and popular meaning in the case before it, to-wit:
"an event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation;
an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event. "16 The cause was,
therefore, remanded in conformity with what appears to be the
17
majority view on the point.
The issue in Lentin v. Continental Assurance Company'
dealt with the question as to which of two dates was to be deemed
12411 Ill. 325, 104 N. E. (2d) 250 (1952).
13 The word "accident" has been defined, in workmen's compensation cases, as a
happening "traceable to a definite time and place of origin." See the Appellate
Court holding in the instant case, 342 Ill. App. 456 at 459, 97 N. E. (2d) 132 at 134.
See also Peru Plow & Wheel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 311 Ill. 216, 142 N. E. 546
(1924); Labanowski v. Hoyt Metal Co., 292 Ill. 218, 126 N. E. 548 (1920); and
Matthiesen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 378, 120 N. E. 249
(1918).
14 411 Ill. 325 at 331, 104 N. E. (2d) 250 at 254.
15 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.6(c).
16411 Ill. 325 at 332, 104 N. E. (2d) 250 at 254. See also Pioneer Life Ins. Co.
v. Alliance Life Ins. Co., 374 Ill. 576, 30 N. E. (2d) 66 (1940), and Lenkutis v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 374 Ill. 136, 28 N. E. (2d) 86 (1940).
17 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pioneer Seafoods Co., 116 F. (2d) 38 (1940) ; Shaw
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 101 F. (2d) 92 (1938); Globe Indemnity
Co. of New York v. Banner Grain Co., 90 F. (2d) 774 (1937)
Hoage v. Royal
Indemnity Co., 67 App. D. C. 142, 90 F. (2d) 387 (1937) ; American Mutual Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Agricola Furnace Co., 236 Ala. 5&5, 183 So. 677 (1938); King v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 123 Conn. 1, 192 A. 311 (1937); Aldrich v. Dale, 43 Ida. 30,
249 P. 87 (1926); Tomnitz v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 343 Mo. 321, 121 S. W.
(2d) 745 (1938); Webb v. New 'Mexico Pub. Co., 47 N. M. 279, 141 P. (2d) 333,
148 A. L. R. 1002 (1943) ; McNeeley v. Carolina Asbestos Co., 206 N. C. 568, 174
S. E. 50 (1934).
18412 Ill. 158, 105 N. E. (2d) 735 (1952), affirming 343 Ill. App. 193, 98 N. E.
(2d) 544 (1951).
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the effective date of a non-cancellable accident and health policy,
the date set forth in the policy itself or the date of actual delivery to and payment of the first premium by the insured, where
the application, expressly made a part of the policy, provided
that the insurance was not to be effective until these conditions
precedent had been fulfilled. 19 The facts therein, briefly stated,
were that on December 4, 1945, plaintiff had applied for the policy,
which was issued on the 17th but bore date of December 12th.
Delivery was made to plaintiff on or before January 2, 1946,
and payment was forwarded to the company on January 4, 1946.
In 1949, plaintiff delayed sending his check for the annual renewal premium until January 13th, which check the insurer
accepted conditionally, indicating that the policy had lapsed and
could be reinstated only by compliance with certain conditions.
Plaintiff refused to apply for reinstatement and initiated an action
for a declaratory judgment both as to the effective date of the
policy and its present status.
The trial court had ruled that, as the provision contained in
the application was "an effective and binding clause," the insurance could not be said to have taken effect until all its conditions
had been met, to-wit: January 4, 1946, so that the payment of
the annual renewal premium was well within the grace period.
The Appellate Court for the First District, with one dissent,
affirmed that holding on the basis that any ambiguity in the
effective date provisions required a construction most favorable
to the assured. 2 The Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed.
The defendant had argued that, when a policy specifically
states an effective date, such date is to be controlling in determining the due dates of subsequent premiums, without regard to the
actual delivery date, and that the fixing of another effective date
19 The terms of the application are set forth in 412 Ill. 158 at 160, 105 N. E. (2d)
735 at 736.
20 The dissenting judge had rested his opinion on the point that, whatever the
general rule might be, the Illinois Insurance Code required that the date stated in
the policy should be construed as the effective date. In that regard, Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 968(1) (b), states that no policy shall be Issued "unless the
time at which the insurance thereunder takes effect and terminates is stated in a
portion of the policy preceding its execution by the insurer."
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by the court would be to change the contract terms. Plaintiff, on
the other hand, contended that the only mutually arrived at terms
regarding the effective date were those contained in the application. It is axiomatic that if, in fact, the parties have agreed
upon a specific effective date, that date is controlling. 21 But what
is the rule to be where the parties have not so agreed? Case
examination reveals the existence of two views. Some courts
favor the defendant's theory that the date stated in the policy
"should prevail over the provisions of the application which state
that the insurance shall not take effect until delivery, payment
of the first premium, etc. 1 '2
Others have reached a contrary
result, basing the holding on the proposition that to decide otherwise would compel the insured to pay something for nothing, the
premium payment being required for a period during part of
23
which the insured was without coverage.
Only one Illinois case squarely in point could be cited, that
of Stragmagliav. Conservative Life Insurance Company,24 where
the result reached was in accord with the instant decision, but
numerous other Illinois cases, not directly in point, can be mentioned to support the view that, where a delivery condition
attaches, the date of delivery is the effective date of the policy.2 5
The court also experienced no difficulty with the contention that
the provisions of the Illinois Insurance Code controlled 26 by
21 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 236 U. S. 167, 44 S. Ct. 90, 68 L.
Ed. 235 (1923); Shira v. New York Life Ins. Co., 90 F. (2d) 953 (1937).
22 This view has been adopted in cases where the only condition dealt with the
payment of premiums: McCampbell v. New York Life Ins. Co., 288 F. 465 (1923);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Silverstein, 53 F. (2d) 78 (1935) ; Pladwell v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 134 Misc. 205, 234 N. Y. S. 287 (1928).
23 Expressions of this view may be found in Shinall v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 91 Colo. 194, 14 P. (2d) 183 (1932) ; Stramback v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 94 Minn. 281, 102 N. W. 731 (1905) ; Halsey v. Amer. Central Life Ins. Co., 258
Mo. 659, 167 S. W. 951 (1914). See also Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance
(West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1930), 2d Ed., p. 287.
24 319 Ill. App. 20, 48 N. E. (2d) 719 (1943).
25 Weber v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 284 Ill. 326, 120 N. E. 291 (1918);
Midira v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 283 Ill. App. 100 (1935) ; Rogers v. Western &
Southern Life Ins. Co., 280 Ill. App. 547 (1935); Laughlin v. North American
Benefit Corp., 244 Ill. App. 391 (1927) ; Steinsultz v. Illinois Banker's Life Ass'n,
229 Ill. App. 199 (1923) ; Ellis v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co., 206 Ill. App. 226
(1917).
26 The text of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 968(1) (b), is set out in
note 20, ante.
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pointing out that policy construction was made necessary by
reason of ambiguity in the policy language. It noted that the
statute "cannot [be made to] serve as a cloak behind which the
insurer can arbitrarily select an effective date . . . not based
27
upon or consistent with the express agreement" of the parties.
Trite sayings probably have no place in a dignified law review
but the admonition "Never underestimate your adversary" is as
much to be followed in the court room as in the boxing ring. The
truth of this fact is thoroughly demonstrated by the case of
Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York 28 recently
decided by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The
plaintiff there, having been forced to pay a judgment entered
against him in a dram shop case, sued his insurer for reimbursement of that amount by which the judgment exceeded the policy
limits, alleging that the insurer breached its duty by failing,
through its attorneys, properly to investigate and try the case 29
and also by refusing to settle, following an opportunity to do so,
within the policy limits. The trial court had found for the plaintiff and the decision was affirmed on the basis there was no adequate reason for not adhering to the rule laid down in Olympia
0
Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indemnity Insurance Company,
the only Illinois case in point. There is general agreement on
the score that a liability insurer which has breached its duty
should be made to suffer to the extent of the excess judgment
recovered against the insured, but disagreement does exist concerning the degree of proof which the insured must establish before becoming entitled to recover such excess. When adhering to
the rule of the Olympia case, one expressing the more liberal
27 412 Ill. 158 at 170, 105 N. E. (2d) 735 at 741.
28 196 F. (2d) 96 (1952).
29

The facts disclosed that the insurer's attorneys had seriously underestimated

the ability of their opponent, a neophyte at the bar; had failed to contact a key
witness, of whom they had knowledge at an early stage, until two days before the
trial at which time she refused to talk; had failed to communicate an offer to
settle, for less than the policy limits, to the company; and, while it appeared that
an appeal might have resulted in a reversal, allowed the time for filing an appeal
bond to expire, although informed that the insured was willing to deposit cash or
security for his share.
30325 Ill. App. 649, 60 N. E. (2d) 896 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEw 198.
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view,8 ' the court expressed the belief that an insurance company,
concerned with investigating, defending, settling, or appealing,
should "give the interests of the insured equal consideration with
32
its own interests."
SALES

One sales case calls for comment.3 3 In Keller v. Flynn,3 4 a
farmer purchased certain hogs at an auction sale and, when he
paid for the hogs at the sales office, was given a printed sheet
which stated, in part, "not responsible for stock after leaving the
premises." The hogs were later found to be diseased. In a suit
for breach of warranty instituted by the buyer, the seller defended, among other things, that the sheet handed to the buyer
amounted to a disclaimer of warranty. The trial court disagreed
with that contention, and the Appellate Court for the Second District affirmed, declaring that a disclaimer of warranty would be
ineffectual, if made after the contract had been concluded, unless
the buyer should assent to the change. There being no evidence
that the buyer assented to, or even knew of, the alleged disclaimer,
he was not bound thereby.
SURETYSHIP

It is rarely the case that one who is surety for the obligations
of another comes into open conflict with the creditors whose claims
he has guaranteed to pay. If he should do so, as by claiming
subrogation, he must yield to the superior equities in favor of the
creditors whose claims he has offered to secure, for it would be
inequitable to allow him to share in the assets of the principal
31 Douglas v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 A. 708, 37 A. L. R.
1477 (1924); Tiger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 163 S. C. 229, 161
S. E. 491 (1931) ; G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S. W.
.(2d) 544 (Tex. Comm. App., 1929). The contrary view requires proof that the
insured acted fraudulently or in bad faith: Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242
Ky. 447, 46 S. W. (2d) 777 (1932); Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 298
Mass. 141, 10 N. E. (2d) 82 (1937) ; City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co.,
246 Mich. 645, 225 N. W. 643 (1929) ; Best Building Co. v. Employers' I.iab. Assur.
Corp., Ltd., 247 N. Y. 451, 160 N. E. 911, 71 A. L. R. 1464 (1928).
32 196 F. (2d) 96 at 102.
33 Attention is also drawn to a sales case mentioned above, note 1 ante, concerning
the right of a seller to assert the statute of frauds in defense of an action for
breach of a sale contract.
34 346 Ill. App. 499, 105 N. E. (2d) 532 (1952).
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debtor until the debt he set out to protect has been paid in full.3 5
That view has now received additional sanction by the decision in
Willis v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland,36 a case which
grew out of the financial collapse of a community currency ex37
change which had been operating under a statutory license.
After insolvency and the appointment of a receiver, the paid
surety was asked to make good on an insurance policy it had
issued, designed to protect the exchange from loss by embezzlement or the like."
It endeavored to offset against its liability
thereunder the amounts which it had paid in favor of the holders
of money orders issued by the exchange pursuant to the terms
of a license bond which it had also issued.3 9 The court denied the
right to such an offset, following the theory aforementioned, treating the surety's obligation as being one, whether under either or
both instruments, to pay the losses in full to the extent agreed
before becoming entitled to indemnity or reimbursement. It also
held that orderly administration of the receivership proceeding
required that full payment should be made by the surety of its
obligation, with privilege to file a claim for refund, rather than
to permit the surety to make its own deduction and pay in only
40
the net difference.
The rights of a surety-pledgor were involved in Holyoke v.
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company4 ' for the
financial institution there concerned, having a matured credit due
it for money loaned to a parent, granted an extension on the
35 American Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co., 296 U. S. 133, 56 S. Ct.
9, 80 L. Ed. 105 (1935).
36 345 Ill. App. 373, 103 N. E. (2d) 513 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
37 Businesses of that character are regulated pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
;Vol. 1, Ch. 16 , § 30 et seq. The court held that the amendments thereto, made
by Laws 1951, p. 551, were inapplicable inasmuch as the several claims arose prior
to the effective date of the revision.
38 Insurance against such risks is now required by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1,

Ch. 16 , §36.
39 Provision for a license bond appears in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 16 ,

§ 35.

40 To that extent, the court differed from the procedure outlined in Mack v.
Woodruff, 87 Ill. 570 (1877). The court there, while denying setoff, permitted the
surety to retain its pro-rata share and compelled payment only of the balance
thereafter due the insolvent estate.
41346 Ill. App. 284, 104 N. E. (2d) 838 (1952).
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basis that both the parent and his daughter, the latter acting as
surety or guarantor, would each deposit individual collateral
securities to cover the loan. When further default occurred, the
bank realized from the sale of the daughter's collateral and thereafter surrendered to the parent the securities which he had deposited. The daughter claimed that such conduct amounted to a
conversion of her property, on the theory that the principal
debtor's collateral should have been exhausted first, or else violated her right to secure subrogation from the parent's collateral
which, she claimed, should have been retained for her benefit. A
trial court decree denying relief to the daughter was, in this
respect, affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District
on the ground the terms of the secured note authorized the pledgee
to sell any or all of the collateral so deposited without restriction
and, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, there would be
no obligation in law forbidding a surrender by the creditor to
the principal debtor of the collateral which he had furnished after
satisfaction had been obtained by the creditor. There is little that
can be criticized as to the first part of the holding for permitting
the creditor to have recourse to any part of the collateral merely
effectuates the creditor's purpose in seeking security. The second
point has some support in law, but not without criticism, 4 2 for it
would seem to follow, as a correlative from the creditor's obligation to preserve the security for the surety's benefit in case
subrogation arises, that the creditor should do nothing to put the
pledged collateral beyond the surety's reach.
Other issues of law involving elements of suretyship arose in
connection with bankruptcy matters but, being peculiar to federal
law or resting upon particular federal statutes, fall beyond the
ambit of this analysis of state law, hence are not here discussed.

42Hunsberger v. Perkiomen Nat. Bank, 108 Pa. St. 443, 164 A. 839 (1933).
holding therein was criticized in a note in 47 Harv. L. Rev. 142.
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